Barber Shops, Salons, and Spas: The Complexity – and Simplicity – Of Implementing Outreach and Enrollment Contracts Under The Affordable Care Act by Hatch, Michael et al.
Journal of Public Management & Social Policy 
Volume 26 Number 2 Article 3 
May 2020 
Barber Shops, Salons, and Spas: The Complexity – and Simplicity 
– Of Implementing Outreach and Enrollment Contracts Under The 
Affordable Care Act 
Michael Hatch 
American University, mh5046a@american.edu 
Rebecca Yurman 
American University, rebecca.yurman@american.edu 
Anna A. Amirkhanyan 
American University, amirkhan@american.edu 
Jocelyn Johnston 
American University, johnston@american.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/jpmsp 
 Part of the Political Science Commons, Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration 
Commons, and the Urban Studies and Planning Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hatch, Michael; Yurman, Rebecca; Amirkhanyan, Anna A.; and Johnston, Jocelyn (2020) "Barber Shops, 
Salons, and Spas: The Complexity – and Simplicity – Of Implementing Outreach and Enrollment Contracts 
Under The Affordable Care Act," Journal of Public Management & Social Policy: Vol. 26 : No. 2 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/jpmsp/vol26/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern 
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Public Management & Social Policy by an authorized 
editor of Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern University. For more information, please contact haiying.li@tsu.edu. 
 
 
Barber Shops, Salons, and Spas:  
The Complexity – and Simplicity – of Implementing Outreach  
and Enrollment Contracts Under the Affordable Care Act 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was signed into law on 
March 23, 2010.  Its primary goal was to extend affordable, comprehensive, and 
quality public and private health insurance coverage as widely as possible and to 
contain growth in health care spending through new regulations on consumer 
protections, creation of insurance marketplaces, individual mandates for purchasing 
health care, Medicaid expansion, and other reforms.  The ACA was implemented 
through a complex system of formal and informal arrangements among federal, 
state, nonprofit, nongovernmental, and private institutions. This study analyzes the 
implementation of a central element of the law in six states, drawing on data we 
collected in 2015 and 2016 through semi-structured interviews with forty key 
program stakeholders.  The objective of our inquiry is to identify factors that 
facilitated and inhibited implementation, and their influence on achieving the law’s 
objectives.  
The ACA is unique in terms of its scope, political controversy, and perhaps 
most importantly, its impact on uninsured individuals and the American social 
safety net (Nathan, 2016).  The law offers an opportunity to examine a variety of 
key governance issues including its reliance on inter-organizational collaboration, 
and on “market” strategies such as private insurance markets and government 
contracting.  Like many public programs, the ACA relies on outsourcing as an 
important option for not only service delivery, but also for service support such as 
outreach, eligibility determination, and enrollment.   
One of the prominent requirements of the law was the establishment of 
healthcare exchanges (or, marketplaces) through which individuals could review 
and purchase health care coverage (Sebelius Testimony, October 30, 2013.)  To 
enroll qualified people, states were given the option to create their own exchanges 
or use the federal exchange – Healthcare.gov.  Thirteen states opted for their own 
marketplaces, while the rest relied on the federal exchange and its web portals for 
state-specific plans and premiums (Kaiser Family Foundation, n.d., State Health 
Facts).  Successes and failures of the information technology contracts awarded by 
state and federal agencies to implement health exchange web sites were widely 
publicized in the media and investigated (GAO, 2014).   
However, less is known about another key aspect of the ACA 
implementation that involved significant contracting activity: outreach and 
enrollment services designed to “take-up” eligible uninsured individuals. 
Regardless of states’ decisions on the type of marketplace exchange, the law 
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required all states to establish navigator programs for outreach and education, and 
gave the option to establish separate IPA (in-person assistance) programs with 
“assisters” to help individuals with applications and enrollment (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2013).1  All states received substantial federal funding to support their 
outreach and enrollment programs, and most states contracted these functions to 
nongovernmental organizations. Many of them, in turn, subcontracted with other 
entities.   
State outreach and enrollment programs were clearly perceived by 
policymakers as critical to outreach and enrollment support, meeting program 
goals, and enhancing outcomes (Sebelius, 2013).  We draw on implementation and 
contracting theories to assess states’ contracted outreach and enrollment services, 
but we focus primarily on the elements of collaboration and network theories, and 
whether and how they emerge in the design and impacts of state strategies.  Our 
inquiry therefore treats ACA implementation as a case through which we can 
examine these theories in the context of a contemporary social welfare innovation 
of substantial scope.   
We examined ACA outreach and enrollment dynamics in six states. 2 Each 
of the states created its own ACA marketplace exchange (as opposed to relying on 
the federal exchange). Each also expanded Medicaid to “capture” individuals with 
incomes above the previous Medicaid eligibility levels, but below the ACA 
premium subsidy thresholds.  Although the law’s original requirement for Medicaid 
expansion was eliminated due to the Supreme Court’s 2012 National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius decision, each of our sample states retained 
Medicaid expansion voluntarily, as an essential element of its insurance expansion 
strategy, and contracted with nongovernmental organizations for navigation and 
enrollment services.   
We observe variation in a set of states that did not differ substantially on the 
dimension of support for the ACA.   We note that none of these states adopted anti-
ACA stances such as those identified by Rigby (2012); unlike the 32 “resister” 
states she identified, none of these states filed lawsuits challenging the law, passed 
 
1 In some states, navigators provide both education/outreach and assistance with applications and 
enrollment; in others, states contract with navigators for outreach and education, but contract 
separately with assisters for enrollment, and in some states, both types of programs cover all 
elements of outreach, education, and enrollment (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2013).  Private 
insurance brokers also served as assisters through marketplace exchange contracts (Corlette, 
Blumberg, & Wengle, 2014).  Our analysis did not distinguish among the formal types of 
outreach/educators/assisters, but instead focused on each state’s overall system for reaching, 
educating, and enrolling eligible individuals. 
2 The six states are Colorado, Connecticut, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, and New York.  We 
chose these states based on their shared approach to several key aspects of policy implementation, 
as well as their variation on several important dimensions that are equally germane to the goal of 
the study.  We explain our state selection strategy in the Methods section.  
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legislation opposing any or all of its elements, or passed up federal implementation 
grants.  Instead, our sample of states is comparable on the dimension of a 
willingness to expand Medicaid and aggressively pursue the ACA’s provisions.  
Thus, our focus on this set of states limits the generalizability of the findings, but 
benefits from a reasonable level of policy comparability across cases. The latter is 
conducive to case study analysis and development of theoretical propositions. We 
look for patterns of variation or similarity within a subset of such states to shed 
light on how individually tailored state strategies supported the law’s 
implementation. In examining the interview data, supplemented with 
administrative data and reports, patterns inductively emerged which indicated that 
the unique features of the ACA contracts in these states, combined with several 
other policy-related or environmental factors, fostered a richly collaborative, less 
formalized, explicitly networked approach to reaching eligible individuals than we 
might observe in typical contracts. The role and the characteristics of contracting 
that might have complicated implementation were, in effect, “drowned out” by 
clear patterns of highly collaborative arrangements that involved extensive chains 
of diverse outreach/enrollment actors.  These actors ranged from experienced health 
advocacy professionals to community members recruited to find enrollees in places 
where they were likely to congregate such as barbershops, salons, and spas, as well 
as churches, schools, and hospitals.  In short, the traditional model used in most 
social welfare programs – “intake” offices that process applications and determine 
eligibility – was replaced with a highly decentralized, outward-focused, 
community-based strategy designed to minimize barriers to enrollment.   
Our data help explain how the sampled states’ strategies created and 
supported collaboration, and how these strategies relate to the observed differences 
in the quality of collaboration and, ultimately, the ACA implementation. Our 
analysis focuses on questions we posed in the context of state enrollment success 
three years into ACA implementation: What were the dominant features of states’ 
implementation tactics?  How did they perform in terms of their sustainability and 
the program’s goals?  How did states address the challenges related to the 
involvement of multiple organizations, sectors, and levels of government, in their 
strategies?    
In the next section, we provide the context for our research by briefly 
reviewing the law, as well as the scholarship on implementation, government 
contracting, and collaborative service delivery, all against the intergovernmental 
backdrop of the ACA. These themes, as derived from our review, frame our 
research questions and inquiry.  We then follow with brief introductory summaries 
of the marketplaces for each state in our sample.  Next, we describe our research 
strategy and present the results of our analysis.  Finally, we conclude with 
implications for the observations that we derive from the patterns identified in the 
data.  
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THE BACKGROUND OF ACA IMPLEMENTATION  
 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) includes ten statutory titles and a wide range of 
reform elements, all delineated in a highly complex statute that exceeds 1,000 pages 
(Thompson, 2013). Peter May (2015) cites “the enormous complexity of the [law] 
marked by numerous provisions stitched together in search of a politically viable 
policy reform” (p. 277).  The law’s complexity, combined with its federal structure 
and highly contested politics, suggests that implementation would be fraught with 
familiar impediments: goal conflict and related agency problems inherent in a 
federal system; buy-in and action required from multiple organizations and actors 
(across sectors as well as federal levels); extensive accountability chains; 
institutional capacity deficits; and redistributive design, among others (Derthick, 
1972; Matland 1995; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1983; O’Toole, 1988; Peterson, 
Rabe, and Wong, 1986; Pressman, Wildavsky, 1973; Stoker, 1991; Van Meter and 
Van Horn, 1975).  Indeed, the granting of implementation authority to states, 
reliance on private insurance markets as a foundation, and the inevitable role of 
contracting, are all essential components of the policy that had the potential to take 
the law through months, if not years, of implementation drag.  States’ extensive 
stakeholder engagement, combined with agreement among many stakeholders on 
the fundamental goal of the law – to increase insurance coverage – may have helped 
to reduce friction across organizations, governments, and sectors and result in 
improved individual experiences. 
 Despite attempts by President Trump and Congress since the 2016 election 
to “repeal and replace” Obamacare, the ACA had succeeded in extending insurance 
to some 20 million previously uninsured individuals by mid-2018 (Sullivan, 2017; 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018). It has also garnered increased 
levels of political support.  State outreach and enrollment systems have been 
successful in reaching sizeable numbers of eligible individuals.3  As described 
below, in our six-state sample, there is evidence that many of the typical and 
uniquely ACA-related barriers to implementation were overcome through the 
design and establishment of effective outreach and enrollment strategies that relied 
on collaborative networks of community actors.   These networks were able to craft 
comparatively simple systems that broke through the implementation complexity 
inherent in the law, thereby creating new capacity and achieving significant 
enrollment gains. 
 
ACA Implementation and Contracting 
 
3 Whether or not agencies are “unable” to create a good or service, agencies may be constrained in 
terms of staffing resources and flexibility and may face political imperatives to outsource 
regardless of capacity. 
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The United States has a long tradition of reliance on the private sector for the 
delivery of public services (Savas, 2000).  Contracts for case management for 
welfare to work programs, child welfare, Medicaid and other health and human 
services delivered through intergovernmental programs, administered jointly by the 
federal and state governments, have become common.  The ACA – the largest 
social welfare and health policy initiative in decades – also relies heavily on 
intergovernmental systems.  Responsibility for key aspects of the law’s 
implementation was delegated to states, which in turn contracted with a variety of 
public and private actors to implement these functions. Many of these actors then 
entered into subcontracts, a phenomenon that is sometimes referred to as 
“contractual devolution” (Nathan & Gais, 1998).  
While one ostensibly positive feature of contracting is a higher degree of 
flexibility and, in some cases, cost savings, contract performance can be 
complicated by informational asymmetries, low outcome measurability, high-cost 
management and oversight systems, or worse, by inadequately funded monitoring 
(Anna Amirkhanyan, Meier, & O’Toole, 2017; Johnston & Girth, 2012; Johnston 
& Romzek, 2010; Kelman, 2002; Milward & Provan, 2000). For services such as 
nursing homes (Amirkhanyan, 2008; Amirkhanyan, 2009; Anna Amirkhanyan, 
Kim, & Lambright, 2008), child welfare and other social welfare systems ( Johnston 
& Romzek, 2008; Romzek & Johnston, 2005), municipal services (Brown & 
Potoski, 2003; Girth, Hefetz, Johnston, & Warner, 2012; Hefetz & Warner, 2004; 
Johnston & Girth, 2012) and mental health systems (Milward, Provan, Fish, Isett, 
& Huang, 2010), aligning the incentives of the contracted agency with 
governmental objectives has proven to be demanding in that it amplifies the 
implementation management barriers cited in scholarship on street-level 
bureaucracy and bureaucratic discretion (Lipsky, 1980).  
For contracts involving intergovernmental programs, complexity is an 
inevitable consequence of grafting new regulatory and administrative infrastructure 
onto already complex service-delivery, advocacy, and other types of institutions 
that encompass multiple organizations, programs, and actors spanning sectors and 
governments. In the context of the ACA, these include institutions related to the 
Medicaid program, various public health programs, and state-regulated private 
health insurance industries, among others.  Another salient feature of the ACA’s 
implementation environment common to intergovernmental programs is the level 
of uncertainty surrounding the future political and financial direction of the entire 
program and its various components.  As the initial federal grants for navigation 
and outreach expired, states with market exchanges grappled with both the 
mechanics and level of funding of future navigation and outreach efforts.  
While competitive and performance-based contracting might help mitigate 
agency problems, in fact many contracts – particularly for social services - are not 
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only non-competitive but also long-lasting and collaborative.4  “Relational 
contracting,” can engender more collaborative arrangements that limit contract 
implementation barriers (though establishing effective “relationships” does impose 
transaction costs (DeHoog, 1981; Johnston and Romzek, 2010).  Contracting 
arrangements embedded in a set of service delivery organizations, may in fact 
function like networks (Johnston & Romzek, 2008).  
The common mission shared by the ACA and many of the contracted 
navigator/assister organizations – the expansion of health insurance coverage to 
uninsured individuals – has the potential to alleviate network and contract 
management hurdles and to facilitate a more “relational,” cooperative design of 
service delivery.  In the following section, we use collaboration and networked 
governance concepts to further explore the ACA’s implementation. 
 
FRAMING ACA’S IMPLEMENTATION AS A  
COLLABORATIVE ENTERPRISE 
 
Isett et al. (2011) define networks as “collections of government agencies, 
nonprofits, and for-profits that work together to provide a public good, service or 
“value” when a single public agency is unable to create the good or services in the 
desired quantities.” 1   Networks are, “by definition…complex conglomerations of 
diverse organizations and individuals” (O’Leary and Bingham 2007, p.104).  The 
foundational structure of networks – multiple organizations, sometimes from 
multiple levels of government and from different sectors – introduces a range of 
implementation hazards.  The greatest challenges in networks have to do with goal 
conflict (O’Toole, 1989; Provan & Kenis, 2007; Provan & Milward, 2001), 
complexity (May, 2015; Romzek & Johnston, 2002) and potential competition over 
scarce resources (Guo & Acar, 2005; Johnston & Romzek, 2008).  Each 
organization in the network brings its own unique set of interests, constraints, 
resources, and cultures to the table (Johnston & Romzek, 2010; O’Leary & Vij, 
2012; Romzek & Johnston, 1999). These must be reconciled into a coherent system 
that works toward a set of shared over-arching goals.  
The most successful networks are collaborative.  Collaboration is enhanced 
by a prior history of cooperation among the network organizations, and effective 
incentives for participation (Ansell & Gash, 2007). Working toward a common goal 
does not obviate the need for defining network structure, designing incentives, and 
establishing trust to facilitate organizational learning and change.  
  
Collaborative Network Structure: Building Capacity and Aligning Goals 
 
4 Collaborative governance refers to processes that “engage people constructively across the 
boundaries” of organization, government, and sector, for the purpose of achieving an objective 
that could not otherwise be met (Emerson et al 2012). 
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Networks and collaboration are primarily process-oriented systems (Barzelay, 
2003; Rhodes & Murray, 2007).  Network process features, such as “face-to-face 
dialogue, trust building, and the development of commitment and understanding” 
create “small wins” that deepen trust, commitment, and shared understanding” 
(Ansell and Gash, 2007, p. 543) and help create the added value and synergy that 
lead the network to deliver programs, with new capacities, that would be either 
impossible or less successful if left to a single organization.   
Rhodes and Murray (2007) reinforce the collaboration process perspective 
by viewing networks through a “complex adaptive systems framework” that 
“allows for the emergence of structure out of the behavior and interaction of agents, 
which then influences the next iteration of agent/behavior/interaction” (p. 81).  This 
framework emphasizes “an unfolding series of events…constrained by the 
interdependencies of agents…and the conditions that pre-existed the system’s 
coming into being” and “observable path-dependencies in agent behavior” (p. 85).  
As Bryson notes, “the more [network] partners have interacted in positive ways in 
the past, the more social mechanisms will enable coordination and safeguard 
exchanges” (Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006, p.46).  
Thus, a strategy of tapping into pre-existing relationships to accomplish an 
objective is consistent with leveraging the path-dependencies, repeated positive 
interactions, and other process elements that characterize successful collaborative 
systems.  In highly complex environments, these systems therefore may have 
already created the infrastructures supportive of adaptation to changing conditions 
that emerge externally, among agents/actors in the network, in policies, and in 
service delivery strategies.   
Networks exhibit a wide range of structures and centralization patterns: 
from self-governing networks, dominated by frequent informal interactions, to lead 
organization networks that are more centralized, operating under the direction of 
one coordinating agency which often holds the monopoly on network power, and 
to network administrative organization (NAO) networks in which a separate 
agency directs and oversees network activity (K. G. Provan & Kenis, 2007).  The 
choice of governance structure may influence network effectiveness and 
collaboration quality. Provan and Milward (1995) concluded that in the 
comparatively formal mental health arena, the more centralized lead organization 
networks were most effective in achieving client outcomes. 
Organizations and actors in networks use a variety of supplemental informal 
mechanisms that enhance both collaboration structures and successful service 
delivery ( Amirkhanyan, 2008; Amirkhanyan, Kim, & Lambright, 2012). These 
include capitalizing on shared norms, relationship building, and the use of informal 
rewards, sanctions, information sharing, and mutual support to move the full 
network toward the service delivery objective (B. Romzek et al., 2014).  
7
Hatch et al.: Implementing ACA Outreach & Enrollment Contracts
Published by Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern University, 2020
 
 
Collaboration in networks can reduce goal conflict through continual reinforcement 
of common missions and strategies that induce cooperation.  As noted above, 
leveraging and strengthening pre-existing relationships can supplement these 
dynamics. 
 
Evidence of Collaboration 
 
Successful collaborations exhibit a set of observable features.  Agranoff and 
McGuire (2001) argue that successful networks activate the skills, knowledge, and 
resources of network members, frame the operative rules that derive from relevant 
values and norms, mobilize organizations and coalitions toward a common 
objective, and synthesize the actors through coordination and shared goals by 
creating “conditions for favorable, productive interaction among network 
participants” (p.300), thereby aligning goals, reducing transaction costs, and 
enhancing trust and other collaborative synergies.  Similarly, “first, second, and 
third-order effects” leverage collaborative networks’ added value (Bryson et al., 
2006).  First-order effects create “social, intellectual, and political capital,” second-
order effects emerge when collaboration is established, but involve “joint action, 
joint learning….changes in practices, and changes in perceptions;” and third-order 
effects represent the synergistic outcomes associated with collaboration – 
“adaptation of services…new norms…generating social capital (p.51).  Rogers and 
Weber (2010), studying environmental policy networks, conclude that the 
outcomes of successful collaboration include, in addition to program success, 
“improving public problem-solving capacity by taking advantage of the 
opportunities provided in these collaborative arrangements to tie together and 
collectively manage interdependent problems and policies” (p.548).  This evidence 
of successful collaboration is by no means exhaustive, but it represents key 
conclusions in leading scholarship on the topic.  
A major policy effort such as the ACA necessarily involved implementation 
through numerous actors across multiple organizations and jurisdictions.  In the 
context of an easily measurable outcome – increased health insurance enrollments 
– we use the analytic lenses outlined above to explore the role, the scope, and the 
features of the law’s formalized, performance-based contractual and 
intergovernmental arrangements, as well as more informal and collaborative inter-
organizational relationships that were central to effective ACA implementation 
networks.  
 
METHODS 
 
Study Sites 
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We examined the ACA’s implementation in a purposive sample of six states – 
Colorado, Connecticut, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, and New York – drawn 
from the population of thirteen states that created their own online marketplaces. 
Additionally, in terms of the policy itself, our sampled states all expanded Medicaid 
eligibility as encouraged by the ACA.  While limiting the generalizability of our 
observations, focusing on a set of states that share some key aspects of policy 
implementation allows us to go deeper into the implementation dynamics in that 
specific sub-set of jurisdictions.  Focusing on these six states also helps achieve the 
level of comparability across cases conducive to identifying rival explanations 
(Yin, 2014).  Our selection was also based on geographic diversity and, most 
importantly, on the variation in the initial assessments of performance of the 
exchanges, with the expectation that the performance of outreach and enrollment 
contracts might be related.  The six sample states also vary on several dimensions 
such as size and socio-economic profile.  
Connecticut, Kentucky, and New York have been widely judged as 
successful in terms of the initial launch of their marketplace exchanges. One year 
into the law’s implementation, they experienced notable drops in the rates of 
uninsured.  In terms of enrollments, one evaluation of enrollment effectiveness, 
provided by the Urban Institute’s 2015 data on state enrollments as a percentage of 
Urban’s projected levels, presents Colorado and Minnesota as performing below 
average, two years into implementation (Holohan et al., 2015). Both of these states 
experienced problems with the launches of their marketplace exchanges (but so did 
Maryland).   
Both Colorado and Minnesota (problematic exchange launches) relied on 
quasi-governmental structures established through legislation, but so did 
Connecticut (launch success).  Kentucky and New York, both successful in terms 
of take-up and exchange launch, incorporated their exchanges into the pre-existing 
state agencies through executive orders.  Maryland struggled early on with a 
botched exchange launch, using a quasi-governmental approach mandated by the 
state legislation.  Thus, it appears that, for this set of states, governance structures 
and enabling governmental mechanisms may not explain the variation in the 
enrollment take-up three years into implementation. 
Of the three states that achieved take-up rates in excess of 30% by 2015 (see 
Table 1), only Maryland experienced early exchange problems, but state officials 
recovered quickly and performed above expectations by 2015.5  These three states 
performed above average in terms of predicted take-up. So did New York, although 
its take-up was at 22% in 2015. This number exceeded expectations and may be 
attributable to the state’s low pre-ACA rate of uninsured.  Thus, exchange launch 
success appears to be a relevant, but not the most important predictor of subsequent 
 
5 Maryland quickly purchased computer code from Connecticut to completely re-tool its health 
exchange. 
9
Hatch et al.: Implementing ACA Outreach & Enrollment Contracts
Published by Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern University, 2020
 
 
enrollment take-up and reflects positively on the contracting protocols used in these 
states. Conversely, in the two states with take-up rates below the expected levels – 
Colorado and Minnesota – the exchange launches were complicated, and 
contracting practices may have played a role. Three years into implementation, 
these two states had still not recovered from their early launch problems.  Table 1 
presents a snapshot of essential elements of our six states’ ACA implementation 
structures and enrollment effectiveness. Table 2 provides more detailed state 
program descriptions.  
[Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
While at this stage of our research we are unable to comprehensively 
quantify the collaborative features of these states’ implementation networks, we do 
observe that particularly deep community network partnerships in Kentucky and 
Maryland may help explain their comparative advantage in reaching eligible 
individuals.  Colorado certainly also relied on these community connections, but 
the depth of ties did not emerge as strongly as the other two states.  All six states 
reported that their implementation systems were highly complex, and Minnesota 
mentioned resource constraints with some frequency.  While the most successful 
states, in terms of enrollment take-up three years into implementation (Connecticut, 
Kentucky, Maryland) clearly relied on leveraging community capacity and 
collaborative strategies, these elements, strongest in our interview data in Kentucky 
and Maryland, helped to raise these states to the take-up levels exhibited by 
Connecticut through its leading early exchange performance.  
 
Interview Strategy and Instrument 
 
While we included deductive elements in our data collection efforts (in the form of 
questions whose answers we expect to correlate with respondent and external 
perceptions of overall effectiveness), our research strategy is primarily inductive 
by nature.  As suggested by Agranoff and Radin (1991), we follow a multiple-case 
study design that is foundational to public management scholarship (Frederickson 
& Frederickson, 2006; Radin & Romzek, 1996; Sandfort, 2000). Within each state, 
we sought to maximize the range of perspectives by reaching out to health exchange 
staff, state employees representing departments that interfaced with the exchange, 
organizations that contracted with (or received grants from) the states to deliver 
navigation and outreach services, as well as subcontractor agencies, and advocacy 
organizations operating in legislative and program utilization venues. Within each 
state, we employed a snowball sampling strategy and completed 40 interviews 
across the 6 states. While the snowball sampling strategy precluded us from 
identifying an exhaustive list of actors necessary for conducting network analysis, 
this strategy can help identify the key features, successes and failures of 
implementation, as reported by a broad range of participants.  Interview data were 
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collected between December 2015 and late summer 2016.  All interviews were 
recorded, transcribed, extracted, coded, and analyzed using NVivo10.  Table 3 
provides details on our respondents in each state. 
[Table 3 about here] 
The interview instrument consists of open-ended questions designed to 
capture the perspectives of each respondent about the implementation of ACA 
navigation and outreach services within the context of the broader ACA 
implementation experience in their state (see Appendix A).  The instrument is built 
around key research questions as described in the introduction, such as the issues 
related to policy implementation, contracting, and collaborative service delivery.   
 
Data Analysis 
 
All qualitative data were imported to and analyzed in QSR NVivo10. The 
interviews were coded and analyzed using a mix of deductive and inductive 
strategies. We started by reading and discussing all 40 interviews and identifying 
the initial set of codes. This was done by the entire research team of four co-authors. 
As the analysis was conducted using the initial set of codes, additional codes and 
sub-codes were added to reflect any emergent themes within the preliminary codes. 
The identification and interpretation of the key themes is grounded heavily in the 
interview data, and less so in the past literature. In the presentation of findings, we 
describe the main themes using quotes and summary statements.  When 
appropriate, we also semi-quantify these themes by reporting their prevalence.  
 
FINDINGS 
 
The patterns that emerge from our data are organized by key aspects of 
implementation and collaboration described in the framework above.  We begin 
with the policy context – in particular, the roles of politics and resources.  We then 
turn to the role of structure including the types of contracting and oversight regimes 
we encountered in our sample.  This is followed by the patterns related to the goals 
– particularly, goal congruence and goal complexity – which are fundamental 
drivers of network collaboration. Next, we assess for the presence of elements of 
collaborative effectiveness - network activation, mobilization, and coordination (as 
emphasized by Agranoff and McGuire (2001)) and the leveraging of community 
capacity and pre-existing relationships to create new social capital (Bryson et al., 
2006) that adds value to implementation efforts.  Essential to enhanced capacity 
and social capital are the roles of trust and commitment in fostering the joint efforts 
that emerged in our data. 
 
Policy Context  
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Policy context often holds the key to the challenges and successes of 
implementation. Contextual policy and political factors associated with 
implementation of the ACA were referred to in the majority of our interviews (n=28 
or 72%).  Several strong themes emerged in the interview data.  First, positive 
political support for the program from state and local politicians was highlighted as 
a notable aid in outreach and enrollment work.  As one respondent remarked, “the 
majority of legislators [in the state] were very supportive, and I used that as leverage 
because constituents wanted to see them, they wanted to see constituents, so I used 
that as an opportunity to increase enrollment efforts” (CT7).  As a corollary 
proposition, one respondent described how her agency was particularly sensitive to 
responding to requests from politicians to address problems their constituents were 
experiencing. In her words, these individuals “shoot their way to the top of the list 
of our people to help” (MD4).   
At the same time, contested politics was also a common theme, even though 
all of the states in our sample opted both to expand Medicaid and implement their 
own exchanges.  Political friction occurred at both the state and local level.  As one 
interviewee described her experience working with state legislators, 
 
“I had legislators telling me “Why is [your organization] going to lift a finger to prop 
up this failed law?”.  And we were in a very difficult spot, because the law is the law, 
and we are a not-for-profit organization with a mission that is making a healthy 
difference for our members…Every step along the way – and I don’t want to paint a 
broad brush, it wasn’t just all Republicans – there was a big group that was 
committed to undermining the law, and we were caught in the middle of that. And 
so were many, many people across the state … and the country. So that was a really 
big deal here, just as it was nationally” (MN7). 
 
In Kentucky, a conscious effort was made to mask the association between 
the state exchange and the ACA in marketing, outreach and enrollment activities, 
given the broad unpopularity of Obamacare in that state.  This strategy proved 
successful in generating support for the Kentucky program, albeit not without 
consequences.  As one respondent observed, 
 
“…the fact that we did such a good job of branding our work as being entirely a 
Kentucky program and really disconnecting it from the Affordable Care Act, I 
wonder if that has had negative consequences that we wouldn’t have expected 
because people don’t associate it with the Affordable Care Act” (KY5).” 
 
Political contention at the local/county level surfaced as an important factor 
driving the level of effort and resources expended on ACA navigation and outreach 
services.  This phenomenon was reflected in county variations in the “willingness 
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to invest, to put resources into writing a grant, and having an assistance site there, 
partnering with local community partners, education people about the ACA” 
(CO8).   
  In addition to politics, resource adequacy emerged as an important element 
of the policy context in 32 (82%) of our interviews.  While some respondents 
considered outreach and enrollment service funding to be adequate, others averred 
that the demand for services far exceeded the supply, and that more could have been 
achieved with additional funding.  As a corollary to this view, the inadequacy of 
reimbursement for groups assisting people with enrollment was stressed repeatedly: 
 
“So $6,000 [award amount] didn’t even begin to cover the number of hours that the 
individual assister spent conducting outreach in the field, the number of what 
marketing would call encounters that … took place to complete the enrollment 
process. So, assister organizations were exhausted, they were frustrated. They were 
nevertheless committed. We had no assister organization pull out of their contract 
for that reason. But nearly every report at the end of the enrollment period indicated 
that this was not enough money” (CT6). 
 
  The uneven distribution of resources between the Qualified Health Plan 
(QHP) program and Medicaid was an important factor as well.  In Minnesota the 
difference in the reimbursement fee paid for assistance with enrollment in Medicaid 
($25) versus a QHP ($70) was widely criticized as being unfair, especially in light 
of the fact that many people in hard-to-reach communities, requiring intensive 
assistance, “qualify for Medicaid and when they qualify for Medicaid, we get 
reimbursed only $25 per person for application” (MN4). 
  Notably, most respondents perceived navigation and outreach not as a one-
off event but as a continuous effort. As the initial federal grants expired and the 
funds available to exchanges for navigation and outreach activities sharply 
declined, services and capacity had to be scaled back despite the continuing need 
for them.  In response to the declining navigation and outreach funding, exchanges 
have focused resources on bolstering technological tools and investing in the 
capabilities of their call centers, and moved away from funding community-based 
activities.  This reliance on technology and shift toward more centralized 
management of navigation and outreach was decried by some as ill advised: 
 
“I think [the exchange] was really working hard to make a case as to why in-person 
assisters are not needed because they had the storefronts and they had the call center, 
right, and people can also go online and yes the bulk of the enrolment did happen 
through the call center. But that’s from people who are, our enrolments were very 
different because we were reaching population that [are] just very hard to reach 
groups. The Vietnamese people; we had Laotian; we had the Arabic community; the 
Arabic speaking community. Those are groups that didn’t, weren’t trying to go to 
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the call center. After, they closed the doors on the program, because the federal 
money was not available” (CT5). 
 
  In the face of uncertain funding for navigation and outreach among 
grantees, the difficulty of managing organizational budgets and retaining staff 
emerged as a key concern. Due to gaps between contracts, the contract process with 
the exchange was potentially problematic, resulting in weeks in which “you have 
nothing to do with your staff” and “you can’t tell them, ‘Okay, you have to go home 
for the next 2-3 weeks until the next time starts’” (MN4). 
The ACA policy context was therefore shaped by high levels of uncertainty.  
Over time, however, the nature of uncertainty has shifted.  When discussing the 
initial enrollment, respondents cited the shifting regulatory and rule-making 
processes within very narrow time frames as major sources of uncertainty.  
Following the expiration of federal startup grants for navigation services after the 
second enrollment period, uncertainty over the levels of funding – and their impact 
on the scope and quality of navigation and outreach services – became significant 
sources of concern.  Finally, as the November 2016 general election drew nearer, 
interviewees reflected on the macro level concerns – specifically, the uncertain 
viability of the ACA, given one candidate’s pledge to abolish it. More uncertainty 
was generated by the decisions of many major insurance carriers, across multiple 
markets, to exit the ACA marketplace for individual insurance.   
To summarize, the patterns we find in our data suggest commonality across 
these states with regard to high levels of political uncertainty and its potential 
impact on resource adequacy.  Uncertainty aside, political support seemed to be 
highest in Connecticut and New York – two states that performed well in terms of 
take-up of their eligible populations.   
We observed that respondents were proactive in framing the policy and its 
implementation in ways that minimized political conflict and appealed to 
individuals across party lines. In short, variations on policy dimensions across the 
state were real but somewhat muted.  The policy context appears to be only 
moderately related to the variation in states’ goal achievement with regard to 
enrolling eligible individuals.  
 
Structural Aspects of Collaborative Activity 
 
A key line of inquiry for this study is to better understand the formal and informal 
inter-organizational arrangements in public-private navigation and enrollment 
efforts.  Nearly all respondents (37 or 95%) delved into specific aspects of the 
collaborative structures supporting ACA navigation and enrollment.  Perhaps the 
most salient characteristic common to all the states in our study was one that 
commonly trips up implementation:  structural complexity.  Respondents often 
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mentioned the number and breadth of entities participating in the states’ 
implementation networks.  In addition to central marketplace exchange staff, 
network actors included state Medicaid agencies, county Medicaid agencies, local 
public health departments, insurance brokers and agents, community-based 
organizations, foundations, and private firms providing call center, marketing, 
advertising, and program management services.  
Not surprisingly, given the multiplicity of actors, network coordination 
presented a major implementation challenge. In particular, the first open enrollment 
period was characterized by struggles identifying “who should be doing what and 
how” and what organization “was appropriate to go to for help” (CO7).  The actors 
within each state were actively engaging in the activities emphasized by Agranoff 
and McGuire (2001) in their studies of networks:  framing (creating operative 
rules), mobilizing (motivating), and synthesizing (coordinating). The structures of 
the state implementation systems consisted of both formal contracts and informal 
relationships among organizations charged with outreach and assistance to 
individuals eligible to enroll in insurance coverage.   
A common strategy involved creating some level of network management 
through designation of the state ACA exchange to function as a coordinating 
organization. Under this scenario, the state’s exchange would funnel resources, 
through grants and contracts, to organizations in the community to provide 
navigation and outreach service. This structure resembles the “lead organization” 
strategy evaluated as particularly successful in Provan and Milward's (1995) study 
of effective community mental health networks.  The provision of services on the 
ground was sometimes managed at the regional level, through intermediary 
umbrella organizations that were awarded grants by the exchange, based on a 
formal RFP.  As described by one exchange official: 
 
“One of the central criteria on … selecting which entities would be given these grants 
awards to be the umbrella organizations in each region of the state was the extent to 
which they could show that they had partnerships and relationships with other 
smaller community-based organizations within their region that were targeted, more 
targeted even for certain populations that we are trying to reach.  
So, I think that, for the most part, that the theory behind that has played out 
successfully, you know, we really have benefited from the local connections that 
Connector entities have and their knowledge of their regions that, you know, they 
have a familiarity with people and their relationship and they have a relationship that 
we wouldn’t have been able to have on our level.” (MD1)  
 
 Thus, selection criteria incorporated leveraging of pre-existing relationships 
to build capacity and minimize transaction costs, consistent with strategies for 
collaborative effectiveness (Bryson, Crosby, and Stone, 2006).  In addition to 
managing navigation services for a specific region or target population, grantees 
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were essential sources of expertise and technical knowledge.  In the words of one 
exchange staff member, “[t]he function and the role of the navigators were to 
provide mentoring, technical assistance, organizing strategy to help assister 
organizations overcome barriers, as well as conduct individual enrollments” (CT6).  
 In general, respondents viewed decentralized structural features and 
delegation of day-to-day operational management to regional grantees as a source 
of strength, though not without pitfalls, as one interviewee noted:  
 
“…It's great that they’ve contracted these local agencies and we can really be 
connected with the folks in the communities. But I think, it does occasionally make 
for a situation where [the exchange] is disconnected from a consumer or a consumer 
experience in ways that we try really hard to make sure they can hear, but we 
occasionally experience disconnect” (MN5).   
 
 Similarly, as described by another respondent, the network configuration 
requires   
 
“… communication in every direction – up, down, sideways, backwards and inside 
out.  If a policy gets made at the board level that impacts the consumer assistance 
and the connector entity, that may go to the staff person at the exchange, who is 
tasked with communicating that, and it may go then to the head of the connector 
entity.  But those connector entities…are made of not just one organization but then 
they fan out into smaller community based organizations around every county.  So, 
that policy piece may go to the staff person, but it doesn’t get down in a way that is 
really reusable to the folks that are working on the ground” (MD 7).  
 
 In other words, the coordination, or synthesizing function (Agranoff & 
McGuire, 2001) was somewhat undercut by a common challenge in collaborations 
– effective information sharing and related transaction costs.  We note, however, 
that despite these issues, respondents were mostly supportive of states’ 
decentralized implementation strategies. 
 In terms of incentives, grantees and contractors typically had specific 
enrollment and outreach performance targets written into their agreements, but in 
most cases, these were not linked to specific bonuses or penalties, nor were the 
targets differentiated by type of plan eligibility (i.e., QHP vs. Medicaid). One 
exception was described by an interviewee from Kentucky:  
 
“they [the contractors] don’t get paid by the application, because a big part of their 
job is education, but they have a range of goals to meet in terms of how they’re 
doing. Then, there is a 10% bonus, and a 10% penalty if they’re not within what 
their numbers should be. Then we had, there were a lot of specifics in there in terms 
of what they’re supposed to do, and how they’re supposed to do it, and then how 
they’re supposed to write a report back to us. For example, if they go to a fair and 
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festival, they need to send us a picture of what their booth looked like or what it is 
that they did. We didn’t want them to be saying you know we were at the Johnson 
County Fair, and then it was like one person was there handing out flyers versus 
you know what we were expecting which is that they would have a table and give 
out materials” (KY4). 
 
  Kentucky, therefore, used performance-based contracting strategies to 
enhance accountability, incorporating rewards and sanctions, but also monitored 
closely by requiring verification of required outreach and enrollment activities. 
  Overall, formal oversight and accountability was vested in part through 
exchange (lead organization) reviews and re-tendering of navigator grants and 
contracts. Some states (such as Minnesota) opted to do this on a yearly basis, while 
other states awarded grants for 2 or 3-year periods.  Monthly reporting to the 
exchange was a common oversight mechanism mentioned in our interviews.  One 
respondent from Connecticut described a strategy that combined a formal financial 
component with an informal moral suasion element: 
 
“So, anyway, I think for some people they just thought I’ll take this money and 
nobody will ever know that I’m not doing anything. But we were very serious, and 
we would say things to people who weren’t doing anything like, you are stealing 
money from poor people. It’s hard to answer that. Don’t give me that, get your work 
done. Because we could have given the contract to someone else, and there are 
people without health insurance, let’s get real about this. We found that most people 
really wanted to do it, they just were stuck, and we helped them get unstuck, and 
some people just didn’t want to do anything and they didn’t do anything. We stood 
on our heads and we did as much as we, could but somebody doesn’t want to do 
anything. So, we held back $1,000 of their contract and we didn’t pay the last 
thousand. So, we paid them $5,000 and we held back $1,000. So, some people didn’t 
get the last thousand, and they were sort of mad but, you know, it’s life. But we were 
very closed on it, and we published the report on who did finish the work and who 
didn’t.” (CT3) 
 
This strategy tapped into common network organizations’ goals as incentives, 
thereby reducing transaction and oversight costs, but when unsuccessful, resorted 
to the more traditional (and decidedly less collaborative) formal, transaction-based 
contracting techniques, including the imposition of penalties and the invocation of 
reputational threats. 
 Thus, the structures of these implementation systems, for the most part, 
were similar across states with regard to their high structural complexity, strongly 
decentralized approaches, and adoption of a lead organization model (Provan & 
Milward, 1995).  Contracting was widely used, and included performance targets, 
but only two states – Kentucky and Connecticut – reported adopting binding 
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contractor performance rewards or penalties; each did especially well in terms of 
meeting enrollment expectations.   
 
Goal Simplicity and Clarity 
 
With a new major policy introduced and multiple actors playing a wide range of 
roles, perceptions of policy goals are important to understanding the strategies and 
outcomes.  Respondents referred to goals in 18 (46%) of the interviews.  Reduction 
in the number of uninsured persons – an easily measurable policy achievement - 
was the most salient goal articulated by many respondents.  Several respondents 
went deeper, citing the issues of affordability, another central goal of the ACA, as 
a constraint on reducing the number of uninsured or even retaining current 
insurance enrollees.  A core challenge was described by one respondent:  
 
“… how do we figure out the system that gets at reducing the people who don’t have 
health insurance, which is exactly what we are doing now, but also offers options 
that are affordable to people? I think that’s always going to be the challenge, and 
moving forward if there’s a way we could figure out the system where people can 
go on, like they can right now on MNsure, search through these different health plans 
and say, “Okay, this works really well for me I’m going to buy this one,” and they 
do, and then the following year [the cost] doesn’t go up by 100% premium.” (MN4). 
 
Further, a need to address the remaining disparities in insurance coverage and 
access to care, based on racial, ethnic, cultural and language barriers, was cited as 
an issue in multiple interviews.  A Minnesota official suggested that the incentive 
structure for navigators be modified to address this: 
 
“... there was a big push to make this navigator program work for populations that 
are not entering through the traditional ways.  You have to make sure you are 
reaching our populations of color, our native populations. And all of these 
populations continue to show the greatest disparities, whether they are insured or 
not.  There wasn’t … there was not a lot (in the first year) of thought given to who 
and what organizations serve which populations, and do we have enough to serve, 
are we making a dent, are we making sure they are well trained to reach populations.  
So, I don’t think there was enough thought to that.  I also don’t think there was 
enough thought given to how to alter the payment structure to reach those 
populations…  I think that navigators needed to be rewarded in a different way to 
make sure they were reaching those populations of color.  They should have had a 
different pay structure for reaching the populations that we said were important for 
us to reach” (MN8). 
 
Our respondents also frequently referred to the goal of educating people on 
being smart consumers of health insurance beyond simply enrolling in coverage.  
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The importance of health insurance literacy was emphasized as a critical element 
of retention and successful transition between different types of insurance coverage 
(e.g., moving from Medicaid to QHP or employer-sponsored plan): 
 
“So, we’ve got folks who have received coverage for the first time through Medicaid 
under the expansion and now … perhaps they are able to purchase private health 
insurance. They’ve got another paying job, they got an extra shift, that sort of thing, 
and making sure that folks know how to navigate health insurance, which we all 
know is not easy, no matter what your education level is…We’re really trying to 
focus on how can we … at a Medicaid level, help them understand how to navigate 
health insurance and what the value of insurance is, so that when they do go up and 
off Medicaid into private insurance, they’re better consumers of health insurance in 
general.  That is something we see as a challenge” (CO7). 
 
  Importantly, trust, commitment, and shared norms, interacting with goal 
agreement, appear to be central to the implementation of ACA across the sampled 
states, as reported in 11 (28%) interviews.  Our respondents identified a range of 
factors positively contributing to the development of trust.  These included 
operational and stakeholder transparency, cooperation between navigator 
organizations to balance workloads, exchange efforts to foster a sense of 
connectedness among navigator organizations, and the positive experiences borne 
of navigator-broker cooperation.   
On the negative side, the partisan political divide over the ACA and an 
initial lack of commitment to sharing information and coordinating activities with 
Medicaid agencies by state exchanges were cited as impediments to the 
development of trust. One commonly noted drawback of the configuration of 
navigation and outreach services was the limitation of navigators to online access 
of applications initiated by consumers.  The conflict between the twin goals of 
ensuring privacy protections of consumers and enabling access to enrollment 
services through multiple venues emerged as a common theme.  Another example 
of goal conflict surfaced in the prohibition against navigators offering advice on 
plan selection, based on the circumstances of the applicant.  Although this 
restriction is in the statute to obviate the possibility of coercion on the part of 
navigators, it limits their ability to provide guidance, which many applicants deem 
desirable.   
Overall, we observed a substantial amount of congruence in the goals 
discussed the by many stakeholders that we interviewed, despite varying levels of 
goal conflict that surfaced during the ACA implementation.  Most respondents 
conceptualized their goals primarily in terms of higher enrollments, with the 
caveats of ensuring affordability and informed decision-making.  With regards to 
the central focus of the ACA, we observed no substantial or systematic evidence of 
perceived or reported goal ambiguity or any notable divergence of goals across 
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multiple parties. This, among many other factors, may have shaped the 
implementation of the law in these states.  
 
Evidence of Successful Collaboration  
 
Having just gone through the process of implementing a major new law, 18 (46%) 
of our respondents explicitly referred to various elements essential to effective 
network collaboration as highlighted in prior research.  These include establishing 
processes and mechanisms for framing rules, mobilizing toward a common 
objective, and synthesizing with coordination and shared goals (Agranoff & 
McGuire, 2001).  Several respondents commented on the importance of broad-
based stakeholder meetings in building support for the exchanges in general, and 
navigation and outreach in particular.  As described by one interviewee, the effort  
 
“was very much a broad-based partnership in terms of planning and building how 
this… how Colorado’s exchange was actually implemented.  It really was designed 
to be a very Colorado-specific effort. And so, that what we created was designed to 
really reflect what the stakeholders wanted and the uniqueness of the state. And, I 
really think that that was something that we did very well and that that was reflected 
also in how the navigator program and the outreach work was established, as well as 
many of the different operational details of the exchange” (CO5). 
 
Catalysts for the mobilization of organizational and other resources 
sometimes derived from opportunities – for example, filling a void in the 
stewardship of a state IT system instrumental to the implementation of the ACA – 
and from cross-cutting affiliations of the key actors.  One example of the latter is a 
Medicaid agency that was able to leverage the executive director’s profession as a 
nurse to mobilize “a whole network of nurses who are out in the community, not 
just the office… They helped us get the word out. And we gave them tools to do 
that” (CO7).  Similarly, exchange board ties to key state entities – for example, the 
director of the state agency overseeing Medicaid – were also cited as helping to 
secure “strong partnerships with those agencies” that “were already heavily 
involved in health care, health eligibility, health insurance, health programs, and 
health access” (MD6). 
 Another collaborative strategy described by respondents was to tap into the 
knowledge and expertise of individuals conducting navigation and outreach in 
order to support the efforts of those who were new to the venture or who were 
experiencing problems.  This type of assistance came in two basic forms: in-person 
support and technological/communication tools.  An example of the former is 
described by one respondent from Connecticut: 
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So, one of the biggest things that we did was we got the assisters together in little 
clusters and we started having them come, we facilitated meetings, monthly meetings 
where we talked about strategies, we talked about the cases, things like elevator 
pitches, how to do it, how to get out there, how to touch the people that you need to 
touch because you couldn’t really be passive if you’re doing outreach…Then the 
navigators worked with the assisters and they started planning community enrolment 
affairs. So, they would … have a fair at the public library in New Haven. They would 
have one in this housing development that was different. For example, the housing 
development one needed more Spanish speaking assisters, and so we started to 
coordinate their efforts” (CT5). 
 
  An example of an enabling technological communication tool was the 
Assistor Resource Center (ARC), a website for navigators and certified application 
counselors in Minnesota to share information, with a dedicated support staff to 
assist in troubleshooting enrollment problems.  This is supplemented by a monthly 
call for navigators, coordinated by the exchange, to disseminate information and 
“hear from navigators, hear about what’s working, what the struggles are” (MN5). 
   Leveraging community capacity by partnering with the existing 
community networks was stressed by respondents in 25 (64%) of interviews as an 
essential component to the success of getting individuals enrolled in health 
insurance: 
 
“What happened was, it appears to me that there were these very large networks of 
organizations that … pre-existed the ACA or kind of advocacy groups for coverage. 
We’ve done some coverage and we’ve done some coverage expansion. So, there 
were some groups that I think had already formed themselves and mobilized to try 
and move those earlier efforts forward... Once the ACA passed and all these funds 
started coming in to the state, they essentially re-mobilized the networks that were 
already in place” (CO2) 
 
 Some respondents described the state environment as being supportive of 
nonprofits in general, with an established pattern of collaboration where people are 
“very open to getting themselves to work on coalitions and work together and be 
constructive” (MN3).  Among the types of networks accessed, pre-existing 
Medicaid assistance networks were referenced by several respondents as an 
important resource, given their prior experience enrolling low income populations 
in health insurance programs. Advocacy networks were also cited as key players in 
shaping the delivery of navigation and outreach services.  In a similar vein, many 
respondents remarked upon the importance of connecting with existing 
community-based organizations working with specific populations that were likely 
to qualify for Medicaid or ACPTS, such as immigrants.  Community institutions 
were also noted as key conduits for outreach, “particularly if their missions had 
some type of social justice component to it” (MD3).  
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  Many of these pre-existing networks relied on connections with public 
health departments, local libraries, churches, and small businesses. They formed 
ties with community leaders, elected officials, and citizen groups.  And, they 
embraced locations in which potentially eligible individuals were comfortable, and 
where trust had already been established through community practices directed at 
reducing health disparities – locations such as barbershops and spas, where research 
has demonstrated success in public health outreach (Browne et al., 2006).  A 
prominent example is the Black Barbershop Health Outreach Program, which has 
focused on “efforts in places outside of traditional clinical and community settings 
such as the barbershop has shown promise for ameliorating [health] disparities” for 
diseases such as colon cancer and hypertension (Releford et al., 2010; p.185).6  
Similarly, “beauty salons represent a promising setting for maximizing reach, 
reinforcement, and the impact of public health interventions aimed at addressing 
health disparities among African American women” (Linnan & Ferguson, 2007). 
  In addition to tapping into existing community networks and resources, 
states worked to cultivate and develop new sources of community capacity.  One 
interviewee described a concerted strategy to identify key individuals, known to 
community members, to help create micro-groups to get different groups “to work 
together who had never worked together before,” with the aim of customizing 
outreach (CT3).  Another respondent described how the exchange targeted 
community leaders, including elected officials, “who represented hundreds if not 
thousands of people within their community,” and “trained them on what the ACA 
is  … and how they can help spread the word” (CT4). 
  Although public and nonprofit organizations were more likely to be 
leveraged in navigation and outreach, private-sector resources were also 
instrumental to the effort.  Brokers and insurance agents were the most common 
sources of private sector participation with ACA navigation and outreach.  An 
example of cooperation between brokers and navigators is the Minnesota Preferred 
Broker Program, in which navigators co-locate in a broker’s office during open 
enrollment.  In the words of one respondent, this approach fuses different areas of 
expertise in a single location, since “brokers don’t necessarily want to deal with 
Medicaid and navigators don’t necessarily know how to answer some of the 
questions that come up in a QHP application” (MN1). Local businesses were also 
recruited to disseminate enrollment information directly to workers, particularly 
among employers who hired part-time staff, such as the barbershops and spas 
referenced above, as well as fast food establishments and small retailers. 
  Most of these states’ network groups were committed to the outreach 
enterprise in part because they shared a common ACA goal – to increase health 
 
6 The Black Barbershop Health Outreach Program has been used successfully to reach thousands 
of African-American men through community-based health screening and other preventive 
programs (Releford et al., 2010). 
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insurance coverage.  The community-based strategy helped to simplify a highly 
complex implementation task.  While elongated chains of accountability can 
impede implementation, in this case, the combination of pre-existing relationships, 
which helped to build or solidify trust, combined with common goals and extensive 
capacity to reach into communities, mitigated transaction costs and fostered 
implementation. 
  In essence, the framing, mobilizing, and synthesizing efforts we observed 
capitalized on established personal and inter-organizational relationships, as well 
as professional ties.  These efforts tapped into the existing expertise of local 
communities and relied on community-based and online vehicles to bring people 
together to inform, strategize, exchange information, and motivate the potential 
collaborators.  These efforts may have helped build extra support for the policy, 
identify additional partners, and reduce informational asymmetries that may have 
affected the next stages of implementation.  In addition, these strategies achieved 
the first, second, and third-order effects referenced by Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 
(2006) as necessary for effective collaboration, generating social capital, service 
adaptation, and joint action and learning.  The synergistic elements of these 
collaborative efforts appear to have generated added value – delivering, as networks 
of organizations and individuals, service levels and quality beyond what could have 
otherwise materialized.   
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Much of the prior discussion about the implementation of the ACA has focused on 
the failures related to information technology. While the marketplace is an 
important component of the law, a broader discussion of implementation – 
particularly of outreach and enrollment services – can add to our understanding of 
how the law has been executed and how similar laws may be best executed in the 
future.  Much can be learned from the work of dozens of agencies, hundreds of 
organizations, and thousands of individuals involved in the implementation effort. 
This paper attempts to shed light on this central part of ACA implementation by 
examining partnerships that may have facilitated increased rates insured 
populations in a sample of six states.  
 In this sample of states, the implementation challenges were more or less 
commonly shared: complexity of the intergovernmental and inter-sectoral 
structures, organizations, and actors; resource constraints; political and policy 
uncertainty; and the use of market mechanisms – contracts and their attendant 
accountability challenges, all increased the potential for serious impediments to 
executing the law. But, perhaps most importantly, in all states under consideration, 
we observed elements of collaboration effectiveness stressed in the prevailing 
theories.  The states in our sample were able to use contracts to create extensive 
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community-based networks that were central to their implementation efforts. These 
collaborative systems were built on pre-existing relationships. They reached deep 
into communities, aligned goals so that the simplicity of purpose trumped 
complexity, and achieved collective synergies that generated social capital, 
adaptation, joint learning, and new capacities.  The activation, mobilization, 
synthesis, and coordination elements needed for effective collaboration emerged as 
strong themes in our data (Agranoff &McGuire, 2001), as well as the added value 
needed to achieve what would not have been achieved without the network (Bryson, 
Crosby & Stone, 2006).  Trust, commitment, shared norms helped the states move 
toward the common goal of increasing insurance coverage and reduce the fallout 
from unavoidable sub-goal conflicts. 
 While federal resources were instrumental to states’ implementation efforts, 
the uncertainty of future funding pushed the implementers to search for solutions 
and to innovate. We observed successful efforts to build on existing local expertise 
and capacity, capitalizing on the strengths of local organizations and actors. When 
needed, states also pursued their own technological solutions. Finally, we saw 
evidence of adaptation and learning among key participants in implementation.   
 The six states varied in their performance as measured by “taking up” 
eligible enrollees.  We speculate that the effectiveness of the first market exchange 
launches may be important in explaining take-up in these states.  Exchange 
governance structures and the legal mechanisms that established them appear to be 
less useful in explaining the variation in take-up.  With this analysis of interview 
data, we suggest that two states with particularly successful and deep community 
ties embedded into their implementation systems – Kentucky and Maryland - were 
able to achieve levels of take-up consistent with Connecticut – the state that led the 
pack in terms of exchange launch success.   
 These findings suggest that the implementation of social programs could in 
the future be facilitated by adopting simple but explicitly decentralized, goal-
focused strategies that draw on established local networks of expertise and 
commitment, and that the use those networks and their individual members, 
especially those who are trusted in their communities, to break down barriers to 
program participation among targeted populations.  Despite the common 
implementation problems related to structural complexity, political uncertainty, and 
resource concerns, what we observed in these admittedly policy-supportive states 
indicates that emphasizing collaborative strategies, and mobilizing community 
resources and organizations with the closest ties to the targeted enrollees, can 
mitigate implementation obstacles.  The states that emerged as most successful on 
these and other collaborative dimensions also enrolled comparatively high 
percentages of their ACA-eligible populations. 
 Our findings are tempered by the limitations of our snowball sample 
strategy within the six states.  Interviewees were not randomly selected from the 
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complete pool of actors involved in their states’ implementation of the ACA; 
therefore, selection bias is a concern.  Generalizability is also an issue, though 
limiting the sample to the states that implemented health exchanges provides for 
more depth and greater comparability in identifying sources of variation in our 
findings (Yin, 2014).  Our conclusions are meant to be suggestive and not 
conclusive.  The next steps in this research should build on this work by formally 
identifying and testing hypotheses, especially as related to collaborative networks, 
across a wider range of states and/or local settings.  Furthermore, new data on the 
post-2016 years is needed that can shed light on the extent to which the early 
successes in these states were sustained (or not).  Despite the limitations of this 
research, it contributes to our understanding of the underlying dynamics associated 
with the implementation of the ACA. It provides insight into how states developed 
complex outreach and enrollment systems that performed well despite of a wide 
range of contextual challenges.  
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Table 1. Characteristics of Exchanges 
State Name Creation 
Date 
Mechanism Governance 
Structure 
Exchange 
Launch 
Uninsured Rate 
Take-Up 
Rate* 
Enrollment 
Success** 
           2013 2014 2015   
CO Connect for 
Care 
Colorado 
07/2011 Legislation Quasi-govt. Problematic 
14% 13% 10% 22% Below 
CT Access 
Health CT 
08/2011 Legislation Quasi-govt. Excellent 
12% 8% 7% 35% Above 
KY Kentucky 
Health 
Benefit 
Exchange 
08/2012 Executive 
Order 
Within State 
Agency 
Very Good 
16% 8% 7% 30% Above 
MD Maryland 
Health 
Benefit 
Exchange 
03/2011 Legislation Quasi-govt. Problematic 
13% 6% 7% 34% Above 
MN MNSure 03/2013 Legislation Quasi-govt. Problematic 8% 8% 7% 22% Below 
NY New York 
Health 
Benefit 
Exchange 
04/2012 Executive 
Order 
Within State 
Agency 
Very Good 
11% 9% 8% 22% Above 
* This information is valid as of March 2016.  Data include individuals who have enrolled in a Marketplace plan, have paid their first month's premium 
("effectuated" enrollment), and *who have an active policy. The take-up rate is calculated based on potential marketplace enrollees; this includes all 
individuals eligible for tax credits as well as other legally-residing individuals who are uninsured or purchase non-group coverage, have incomes above 
Medicaid/CHIP eligibility levels, and who do not have access to employer-sponsored coverage. The estimate excludes uninsured individuals with 
incomes below the poverty level who live in states that elected not to expand the Medicaid program. These individuals are not eligible for financial 
assistance and are unlikely to have the resources to purchase coverage in the Marketplace.  
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation. (2015). Marketplace Enrollment as a Share of the Potential Marketplace Population Kaiser Family Foundation. 
Retrieved November 8, 2017, from https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/marketplace-enrollment-as-a-share-of-the-potential-marketplace-
population-2015/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D 
 **Compared to Urban Institute’s Enrollment Projections as of 2015 (Holahan et al., 2015) 
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Table 2. The Details of State Implementation Structures 
Implementation Structure Details 
COLORADO. Colorado’s market exchange was established by state law in 2011.
78
  Although created as 
quasigovernmental agency, the exchange was registered as an independent nonprofit entity in March 2012. Connect 
for Health Colorado is governed by a Board of Directors appointed by the governor and the state majority and 
minority leaders in the Colorado legislature.  Navigation and outreach services are outsourced to a variety of 
organizations in the community. The constellation of organizations connected to this effort are commonly referred 
to as the ‘assistance network’ while navigators are known as ‘health coverage guides’.  Colorado’s marketplace 
exchange launch was complicated by issues related to its use of funds 
CONNECTICUT. In 2011, Connecticut adopted legislation authorizing the creation of market exchange.  Known 
as Access Health CT, Connecticut’s exchange functions as a quasi-governmental entity.  Its governance structure 
consists of a 14-member governing board, headed by the lieutenant governor.  The board members are selected 
according to their positions in state government, including the commissioner of social services, secretary of policy 
and management, and the state healthcare advocate, or are appointed by elected officials (specifically, the governor, 
and the majority and minority leaders of the Connecticut House and Senate).  Connecticut’s exchange code has been 
viewed as a model and acquired by other states with failed launches, including Maryland. 
KENTUCKY. In 2012, Governor Steven L. Beshear (D) issued Executive Order 587 establishing the Kentucky 
Health Benefit Exchange (KHBE) within the Cabinet for Health and Family Services. In 2013, the state announced 
that its online Marketplace would be called Kynect. Navigators and in-person assisters are known as “Kynectors.”  
Kentucky’s exchange launch has been associated with few concerns, and its success has been attributed in part to its 
simplicity. Following the 2015 election of Republican Governor Matt Bevin, whose election campaign platform 
included promises to dismantle Kynect and the state’s Medicaid expansion, the future of the state exchange is 
unclear. 
MARYLAND. In 2011, Governor Martin O’Malley (D) signed SB 182/HB 166 into law establishing the Maryland 
Health Benefit Exchange (MBHE). In August 2012, the state announced that the name for the new insurance 
Marketplace would be Maryland Health Connection. The law defines the MBHE as a quasi-governmental 
organization, specifically, a “public corporation and independent unit of state government.” The MHBE is governed 
by a nine-member board, including the Executive Director of Maryland’s Health Care Commission as the Chair, 
Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene, Commissioner of Insurance, and six members appointed by the Governor 
 
7 The other seven state-based exchanges are in California, District of Columbia, Idaho, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont, and 
Washington. 
8 The name of the exchange was changed from Colorado Health Benefit Exchange to Connect for Health Colorado in March 2013. 
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and with consent from the Senate. Maryland’s exchange launch was associated with highly visible problems for the 
consumers, similar in many ways the issues of the federal exchange, in part due to its ambitious plan to integrate 
ACA and Medicaid data systems. 
MINNESOTA. Minnesota’s market exchange, MNSure, was created through legislation passed in 2013. MNSure 
is a state entity governed by a Board of Directors appointed by the governor and confirmed by the Minnesota House 
and Senate.  Members serve four-year terms and the composition of the board is subject to requirements related to 
geographical and area-of-expertise representation.  Minnesota’s exchange launch encountered problems early on. 
NEW YORK. The New York Health Benefit Exchange (NYHBE) was created by Executive Order within the NY 
Department of Health. The Exchange was given the authority to work in conjunction with the Department of 
Financial Services and other agencies to carry out the requirements of the ACA.  Although the Executive Order did 
not create an independent governing board for the exchange, it established regional advisory committees, consisting 
of consumer advocates, small business representatives, health care providers, agents, brokers, insurers, labor 
organizations, and other stakeholders, to advise and provide recommendations on Exchange operations. Over 180 
members were appointed to five regional advisory committees.  New York’s exchange launch has been seen as quite 
successful. 
Sources for Tables 1 and 2: Kaiser Family Foundation reports (the rates of uninsured retrieved from http://kaiserf.am/2eNPk54; Rockerfeller 
Institute of Government, ACA Implementation Research Network reports
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Table 3. Interview Respondent by Organization Type 
  State agency Contractor Other* 
Totals by 
state  
Colorado 4 4 0 8 
Connecticut 4 3 1 8 
Kentucky 1 3 1 5 
Maryland 3 3 1 7 
Minnesota 2 6 1 9 
New York** 0 2 1 3 
Totals by type 14 21 5 40 
 *Other" includes advocacy organizations and academic researchers who authored  
Rockefeller Center-sponsored studies of states' ACA implementation approaches 
**New York's low response rate owes to a rule placed on contractors by the state that  
restricts them from speaking to external entities regarding their work for the exchange.  
Repeated attempts to interview respondents from contracting organizations and state  
agencies, including the exchange, were unsuccessful. Our findings section includes  
observations from New York respondents when possible. 
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Appendix A. Interview Instrument. 
 
Note to the Interviewer. Read: “Thank you for agreeing to participate in our 
study.” 
Turn on the voice recorder and identify interview ID and location, e.g., “This is 
Washington DC interview number one.” 
Begin the interview.  
1. I would like to begin by asking about your agency (for nonprofit 
respondents, use “organization”).  What does your agency (organization) 
do? What is its role in the implementation and operation of the ACA? 
2. What is your position and your role with respect to the implementation of 
the ACA? 
3. Please describe your state’s experience with the ACA. We are especially 
interested in your view of the strengths and weaknesses of your ACA 
navigation and outreach services. 
Probe: What makes your state’s experience unique? 
4. Can you describe your state’s administrative or management infrastructure 
for ACA navigation and outreach? 
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a. Has the state conducted (or have plans to conduct) any customer 
satisfaction surveys that you are aware of? 
5. Some states tend to contract out services and functions associated with 
ACA navigation and outreach. Can you tell us about your state’s 
contracting related experiences? (ask about design - sole-source, 
competitive contracts? Performance based?  How many cycles so far?) 
a. Follow up for contractor/sub-contractors: How has your experience 
as a contractor/subcontractor been? 
6. What is your perspective on the adequacy of state fiscal and human 
resources for implementation and operation of your state’s navigation and 
outreach services? 
7. To what extent has state or local politics play a role in implementation? 
8. What do you think your state did and/or does particularly well? 
Probe: Are there “best practices” that could be shared with other 
states? 
Probe: What resources or support have been important in the 
implementation of the Affordable Care Act? 
Probe: What are some of the key lessons you have learned from 
your state’s experience? 
9. What have been the biggest challenges in implementing the ACA in your 
state? 
Probe: How were these challenges addressed? 
10. Are you aware of any documentation or data collected on your state’s ACA 
navigation and outreach contracts?  Sub-contracts? 
11. In your opinion, as of today, how would you evaluate the quality of the 
ACA navigation and outreach infrastructure and implementation in your 
state? 
12. Looking ahead, what challenges do you anticipate? 
13. Is there anything else you would like to tell me that may be important for 
my study?  Is there anything we did not ask about that you think is 
important? 
14. Can you suggest other people or groups I should talk to in your state about 
these topics? 
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